Thank you for the excellent post Dr. Parrish. Though we are Atheists, we greatly admire your work. You're in fact one of the few Christian Apologists to actually take on formidable defenders of Atheism such as Graham Oppy, J.L. Mackie, Erik Wielenberg, etc. We hope that more Christian Apologists can follow your example and seek to engage with the best of Atheism (and of course we hope that Atheists can engage with the best of Theism as well, your work serving as a model).
While the issues in your post can definitely be extended and discussed in a more in-depth manner, we just want to highlight one avenue for the Naturalist and Atheist to take when it comes to questions of existence (namely the challenge offered by Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments from Contingency).
I think the first objection that can be put forward here is that from Hume. We can simply ask why think that an explanation of a whole cannot simply consist of whatever explains each part? We can say that an explanation of the contingent whole simply consists of the conjunction of the explanations of each contingent entity. Then there would be no need for a non-contingent cause.
Another contemporary variation of this response is Quentin Smith's argument[1]. Through the utilization of Big Bang Cosmology we can argue every instantaneous state of the universe corresponding to a number in the interval 0 > x < or = 1 preceded and is caused by earlier instantaneous states. Basically, this means that there is no instantaneous state in the first half-open second or the first half-open one-billionth of a second, which is uncaused. Since the beginning of the universe’s existence is the instantaneous states that are members of a half-open interval, it follows from Smith's argument[2] that the universe’s beginning to exist is internally caused. If Smith is correct then he has defeated the argument from contingency, to quote Smith:
"My explanation mentions only beings that exist contingently; the universe might not have existed and the states of the universe might not have existed. Since the existence of each state is caused by earlier states, and since the existence of all these states entails the universe’s existence, there is an explanation for everything that contingently exists."
Of course. I do think Quentin Smith's work approach can be challenged, but I also think he provides a unique avenue for Atheists and Naturalists to respond to the argument you've outlined here.
Thank you again for the post and we look forward to your future projects on the subject.
Thank you for your kind and gracious words. It is refreshing to receive respectful responses. Thank you again. I will attempt to answer the points you raise.
The Leibnizian argument from contingency is different from the one I defended in the earlier post and elsewhere, and in my book Atheism? Leibniz uses a Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) in his arguments, while I do not.
Your first point is from Hume and asks why an explanation of the whole cannot simply consist of whatever explains each part. So as you write, “[T]he explanation of a whole consists of the conjunction of the explanations of each part.”
My basic response is that this objection does not go deep enough. At one level, one may explain the existence of something by whatever made it. Someone manufactured the chair I am sitting on as I write this, and that is why it came into existence. This is a perfectly good explanation at one level. However, the deepest question is, “Why does the chair exist and continue to exist?”
Taking any particular object, there are three conceivable reasons why it exists at all. There may be A) no reason why it exists, B) the reason why it exists is internal to the object, or C) the reason may be external to the object. The chair is composed of a myriad of subatomic particles, and since their existence is logically independent of each other, I will now concentrate on them.
Take a subatomic particle, like Bob the proton I wrote about in the earlier essay. Why does Bob exist (or if one prefers, the matter and energy of which Bob is composed)? Not B, because then Bob would be a necessary being. Bob cannot be a necessary being because it did not always exist, and there is no contradiction entailed in thinking of Bob’s not existing.
Not A, because then Bob would exist for no reason. Here a PSR is often used, but I will not use it. There has been debate about why anything concrete exists. Some philosophers say that the natural state should be the empty world, where nothing exists except abstract entities (if any). They think that therefore, since things obviously exist, that they must be caused by a necessary being. If one takes this position, then one has moved a long way in the direction of theism, so that is not the road most atheists will want to take.
The other positon is that there is an infinite number of possible worlds, that one of them had to be instantiated, and that an empty world is no more likely than any other. If one takes this alternative, then the fact that our world was instantiated instead of any other one is simply a brute fact, a matter of pure chance. If one believes that possible worlds are abstract entities, then our world is modeled after one of them. If one is a nominalist regarding abstract entities, then one has the nominalist equivalent, whatever that may be. It should be noted that if there are possible worlds existing as abstract entities, they do not cause the actualization of this world. (John Leslie and a few others have argued against this. However, I have argued elsewhere that they are wrong.)
Going back to Bob and the question as to why it exists. If we say that Bob’s existence is a brute fact, as is the existence of everything else, then it exists for no reason. Further, even if Bob exists at time T1, there is no reason why Bob exists at time T2. At every moment it exists, its existence is a brute fact. Which means that at every moment, it is at least as likely to not exist as it is to exist (I would argue far more likely not to exist). What then explains existence inertia?
Therefore, it has to be C—something else is causing Bob’s existence. It is also apparent (by the same thoughts as above) that Bob’s existence cannot be caused by any other contingent entity, like, say, an electron named Mildred. Since Mildred does not have any more reason to exist than Bob, it cannot be the cause of Bob’s existing. So, why is the universe orderly? Why aren’t things popping into and out of existence? Why are there laws of nature? Brute fact theories cannot account for any of this. I believe the reason people do not usually ask why things stay in existence is simply that it is a major part of our experience; something we take for granted. Hence, we do not even think there has to be a reason. Nevertheless, there has to be.
Therefore, we must posit the existence of a necessary being. I will not argue it here, but I have argued it in my book God and Necessity at great length that only the God of Perfect Being Theism can be coherently thought of as being a concrete necessary being.
I think that the same response may be given to Smith’s argument. It is irrelevant to the argument I have made whether the universe has always existed, or came into existence at some time in the past. For the scenario that Smith outlines to exist, he must presuppose that there are laws of nature, and that when things come into existence, they remain in existence. Both of these presuppositions are impossible with brute fact. In a brute fact world, if events happen in a consistent way, this is not an indication of natural law, but only a coincidence. Given a consistent set of natural laws, they can be part in which manner other contingent beings act on each other, but contingent beings cannot be the cause of the existence simpliciter of other contingent beings.
I am not using any version of the PSR here. Even if no version of the PSR is true, the argument still goes through. The point is that were our world really a brute fact, then one would either have no concrete entities at all, or else chaos. Since we have neither, brute fact cannot be true. There must be a cause of the universe, and only a concrete necessary being can be an ultimate explanation.
Thank you for the excellent post Dr. Parrish. Though we are Atheists, we greatly admire your work. You're in fact one of the few Christian Apologists to actually take on formidable defenders of Atheism such as Graham Oppy, J.L. Mackie, Erik Wielenberg, etc. We hope that more Christian Apologists can follow your example and seek to engage with the best of Atheism (and of course we hope that Atheists can engage with the best of Theism as well, your work serving as a model).
While the issues in your post can definitely be extended and discussed in a more in-depth manner, we just want to highlight one avenue for the Naturalist and Atheist to take when it comes to questions of existence (namely the challenge offered by Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments from Contingency).
I think the first objection that can be put forward here is that from Hume. We can simply ask why think that an explanation of a whole cannot simply consist of whatever explains each part? We can say that an explanation of the contingent whole simply consists of the conjunction of the explanations of each contingent entity. Then there would be no need for a non-contingent cause.
Another contemporary variation of this response is Quentin Smith's argument[1]. Through the utilization of Big Bang Cosmology we can argue every instantaneous state of the universe corresponding to a number in the interval 0 > x < or = 1 preceded and is caused by earlier instantaneous states. Basically, this means that there is no instantaneous state in the first half-open second or the first half-open one-billionth of a second, which is uncaused. Since the beginning of the universe’s existence is the instantaneous states that are members of a half-open interval, it follows from Smith's argument[2] that the universe’s beginning to exist is internally caused. If Smith is correct then he has defeated the argument from contingency, to quote Smith:
"My explanation mentions only beings that exist contingently; the universe might not have existed and the states of the universe might not have existed. Since the existence of each state is caused by earlier states, and since the existence of all these states entails the universe’s existence, there is an explanation for everything that contingently exists."
Of course. I do think Quentin Smith's work approach can be challenged, but I also think he provides a unique avenue for Atheists and Naturalists to respond to the argument you've outlined here.
Thank you again for the post and we look forward to your future projects on the subject.
Notes:
[1] http://www.stafforini.com/docs/Smith%20-%20The%20reason%20the%20universe%20exists%20is%20that%20it%20caused%20itself%20to%20exist.pdf
[2] http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/smith-kalam-cosmological-arguments.pdf
[3] ibid.
Thank you for your kind and gracious words. It is refreshing to receive respectful responses. Thank you again. I will attempt to answer the points you raise.
The Leibnizian argument from contingency is different from the one I defended in the earlier post and elsewhere, and in my book Atheism? Leibniz uses a Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) in his arguments, while I do not.
Your first point is from Hume and asks why an explanation of the whole cannot simply consist of whatever explains each part. So as you write, “[T]he explanation of a whole consists of the conjunction of the explanations of each part.”
My basic response is that this objection does not go deep enough. At one level, one may explain the existence of something by whatever made it. Someone manufactured the chair I am sitting on as I write this, and that is why it came into existence. This is a perfectly good explanation at one level. However, the deepest question is, “Why does the chair exist and continue to exist?”
Taking any particular object, there are three conceivable reasons why it exists at all. There may be A) no reason why it exists, B) the reason why it exists is internal to the object, or C) the reason may be external to the object. The chair is composed of a myriad of subatomic particles, and since their existence is logically independent of each other, I will now concentrate on them.
Take a subatomic particle, like Bob the proton I wrote about in the earlier essay. Why does Bob exist (or if one prefers, the matter and energy of which Bob is composed)? Not B, because then Bob would be a necessary being. Bob cannot be a necessary being because it did not always exist, and there is no contradiction entailed in thinking of Bob’s not existing.
Not A, because then Bob would exist for no reason. Here a PSR is often used, but I will not use it. There has been debate about why anything concrete exists. Some philosophers say that the natural state should be the empty world, where nothing exists except abstract entities (if any). They think that therefore, since things obviously exist, that they must be caused by a necessary being. If one takes this position, then one has moved a long way in the direction of theism, so that is not the road most atheists will want to take.
The other positon is that there is an infinite number of possible worlds, that one of them had to be instantiated, and that an empty world is no more likely than any other. If one takes this alternative, then the fact that our world was instantiated instead of any other one is simply a brute fact, a matter of pure chance. If one believes that possible worlds are abstract entities, then our world is modeled after one of them. If one is a nominalist regarding abstract entities, then one has the nominalist equivalent, whatever that may be. It should be noted that if there are possible worlds existing as abstract entities, they do not cause the actualization of this world. (John Leslie and a few others have argued against this. However, I have argued elsewhere that they are wrong.)
Going back to Bob and the question as to why it exists. If we say that Bob’s existence is a brute fact, as is the existence of everything else, then it exists for no reason. Further, even if Bob exists at time T1, there is no reason why Bob exists at time T2. At every moment it exists, its existence is a brute fact. Which means that at every moment, it is at least as likely to not exist as it is to exist (I would argue far more likely not to exist). What then explains existence inertia?
Therefore, it has to be C—something else is causing Bob’s existence. It is also apparent (by the same thoughts as above) that Bob’s existence cannot be caused by any other contingent entity, like, say, an electron named Mildred. Since Mildred does not have any more reason to exist than Bob, it cannot be the cause of Bob’s existing. So, why is the universe orderly? Why aren’t things popping into and out of existence? Why are there laws of nature? Brute fact theories cannot account for any of this. I believe the reason people do not usually ask why things stay in existence is simply that it is a major part of our experience; something we take for granted. Hence, we do not even think there has to be a reason. Nevertheless, there has to be.
Therefore, we must posit the existence of a necessary being. I will not argue it here, but I have argued it in my book God and Necessity at great length that only the God of Perfect Being Theism can be coherently thought of as being a concrete necessary being.
I think that the same response may be given to Smith’s argument. It is irrelevant to the argument I have made whether the universe has always existed, or came into existence at some time in the past. For the scenario that Smith outlines to exist, he must presuppose that there are laws of nature, and that when things come into existence, they remain in existence. Both of these presuppositions are impossible with brute fact. In a brute fact world, if events happen in a consistent way, this is not an indication of natural law, but only a coincidence. Given a consistent set of natural laws, they can be part in which manner other contingent beings act on each other, but contingent beings cannot be the cause of the existence simpliciter of other contingent beings.
I am not using any version of the PSR here. Even if no version of the PSR is true, the argument still goes through. The point is that were our world really a brute fact, then one would either have no concrete entities at all, or else chaos. Since we have neither, brute fact cannot be true. There must be a cause of the universe, and only a concrete necessary being can be an ultimate explanation.